Russian intelligence activities

Operating from Russia on behalf of Russian military intelligence (GRU), a Cuban dance teacher remotely recruited and coordinated foreign proxies—described as “disposable agents”—via Telegram and social media to execute attacks across the European Union.

Key Plots:

Broader European Attacks: Romagoza Durruthy also organized arson and sabotage missions targeting civilian logistics and military supply companies across Poland, Czechia, Romania, and Lithuania

Targeted Dissident Assassination in Washington, D.C. (Summer 2026): The network recruited a U.S.-based resident in Brooklyn to surveil a prominent Russian dissident in the Washington area, using coded language such as “measuring a plot of land for construction”. After paying for surveillance media, Suarez and Castro offered $40,000 to “eliminate” or “make the dissident disappear”.

Lithuania Assassination & Arson Proposal (2025): Kirill Khrameev paid an American $200 to photograph an address in Vilnius, Lithuania. Yuri Khrameev subsequently offered $25,000 to kill a Russian anti-war activist at that address using a knife or petrol bomb^[33]. When the recruit refused the killing, Khrameev offered jobs setting fire to warehouses, gas stations, or power substations in nations supporting Ukraine.

Russian intelligence services are finding new ways to get the information they need and to wreak havoc anywhere.

At the same time, they keep on spying by the traditional way.

In July 2026, the Italian government expelled two Russian GRU-linked military diplomats following the arrest of two former Italian intelligence officers caught passing state secrets. An investigation by Il Riformista subsequently exposed a much broader Russian intelligence network operating out of the embassy in Rome. Within this network, FSB operatives focused on analyzing Italian and NATO military technologies, while SVR and GRU agents worked to infiltrate political, media, and business circles to build influence.

The operatives also mapped Italy’s digital infrastructure for potential cyberattacks, attempted to recruit saboteurs, and utilized Italy as a primary entry point into the Schengen zone for Russian and Belarusian agents. Furthermore, Russian intelligence efforts extended to the Vatican, where an attaché—whose father was expelled in a 2021 espionage scandal—has been gathering intelligence on the Holy See’s internal affairs, diplomatic stances on Ukraine, and peace initiatives.

Let’s not forget the latest event in this field which involves a Spanish Navy officer who was dating a Britsh lady (of Polish/former USSR origin) allegedly related to Russian Intelligence Services. To say the least, she was known to the British intelligence community. This Navy officer was posted in the UK (Northwood) at MARCOM (NATO Maritime Command).

A report on the updated Russian intelligence operations is attached for you to read. It’s a developing activity, adapting to the new normal after the expulsions that took place in 2022 after the war broke out in Ukraine.

First a summary in English, with Spanish subtitles: