Russian intel ops

But Russia is still very active and innovative in order to be able to get what it needs from the West and it is very active to create troubles all over the West, where it can still rely on sympathizers of all kinds.

Some of the known cases of Russian assets in the political milieu are:

Direct Espionage and Intelligence Agents

• Tatjana Ždanoka (Latvia): A Member of the European Parliament (MEP) who was identified by Latvian investigative journalists and security services as having served as an agent of influence for Russian intelligence (the FSB) for more than a decade.
• Mateusz Piskorski (Poland): Former Polish MP and leader of the pro-Russian “Change” party. He exchanged hundreds of emails with Kremlin-linked handlers to organize pro-Russian demonstrations, coordinate anti-NATO operations, and organize paid trips for European politicians to occupied Crimea. He was arrested and charged with carrying out espionage for Russian and Chinese intelligence.
• Béla Kovács (Hungary): A former Hungarian MEP (nicknamed “KGBéla”) who was recruited by Russian intelligence and convicted in 2022 of spying for Russia.
• Algirdas Paleckis (Lithuania): A Lithuanian political figure who worked with Piskorski’s network and was later found guilty of spying for Russia in 2021.
• Ilan Șor (Moldova): A fugitive Moldovan oligarch and politician who established a massive political coordination center in Moscow to sabotage Moldova’s 2024 EU referendum. Intelligence reports confirmed his operation was directly protected and controlled by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).
• Nathan Gill (United Kingdom): The former leader of Reform UK in Wales and a former MEP. He was sentenced to 10.5 years in prison for accepting at least £40,000 in Russian bribes in exchange for delivering Kremlin-scripted speeches in the European Parliament.

Politicians Bribed or Co-opted by Kremlin-Linked Fronts Many politicians were recruited not by uniformed intelligence officers, but through covert Russian lobbying groups (such as Sargis Mirzakhanian’s “International Agency for Current Policy”) or FSB-coordinated media operations like the Prague-based Voice of Europe.

• Germany (AfD Party):
  • Petr Bystron (MP): Reportedly accepted up to €25,000 in cash and cryptocurrency to spread pro-Russian propaganda through the Voice of Europe network.
  • Maximilian Krah (MEP): The AfD’s lead candidate for the 2024 European elections was questioned by the FBI and placed under investigation for allegedly receiving illicit payments from Kremlin agents. His parliamentary aide was also arrested for spying.
  • Markus Frohnmaier (MP): Leaked emails revealed that Mirzakhanian’s network drafted an anti-sanctions resolution for him to submit to the Baden-Württemberg assembly and discussed a budget to fund his 2017 political campaign.
  • Marcus Pretzell (MEP): Received sponsored travel to attend the Yalta International Economic Forum in occupied Crimea and was listed in a Russian document allocating “honoraria” payments to attendees (though he denied being offered money).
  • Manuel Ochsenreiter: Demanded a budget of €12,000 to publish Kremlin-orchestrated pro-Russia propaganda articles.
• Italy (Lega Nord Party):
  • Stefano Valdegamberi (Regional Councilor): Worked closely with Russian lobbyists to pass a resolution in the Veneto regional council recognizing the illegal annexation of Crimea. He attended junkets to Crimea to organize business ventures intended to finance his election campaigns and acted as a “fake” election observer for Russian elections.
  • Paolo Tosato (Senator): Internal Russian documents allocated a budget of €20,000—with an additional €15,000 “success bonus”—for him to present a resolution in the Italian parliament to lift sanctions against Russia.
  • Gianluca Savoini (Aide to Matteo Salvini): Secretly negotiated a deal at Moscow’s Metropol Hotel aimed at funneling up to €58 million from Russian oil sales through shell companies to finance the Lega Nord party.
• Austria (FPÖ Party):
  • Johannes Hübner (MP): Similar to Tosato, a Russian lobbying budget of €20,000 (plus a €15,000 bonus) was earmarked for him to introduce an anti-sanctions resolution in the Austrian parliament.
  • Axel Kassegger & Barbara Rosenkranz: Named in a leaked “European estimates” document that allocated €21,500 in honoraria for European politicians attending a pro-Russian forum in Crimea.
  • Robert Stelzl (Aide/Activist): Received payments to publish Kremlin-coordinated articles in European magazines and acted as an intermediary to arrange trips to Crimea for European politicians.
• France:
  • Marine Le Pen (National Rally): While not accused of traditional espionage, her party actively aligned its policies with Moscow’s interests after securing a €9.4 million loan from the Kremlin-linked First Czech-Russian Bank in 2014.
  • Guillaume Pradoura (Parliamentary Assistant): Acted as a financial intermediary for the Voice of Europe network, facilitating illicit Russian payments to Members of the European Parliament.
• Eastern Europe and the Balkans:
  • Miroslav Radačovský (Slovakia, MEP): Paid by Russian sources to serve as a sympathetic observer during the 2021 Russian parliamentary elections.
  • Evghenia Guțul (Moldova, Governor of Gagauzia): Acted as the executive secretary for the Russian-funded “Pobeda-Victorie” bloc, which operated as a political cover for Moscow’s destabilization operations in Moldova.
  • Dragan Stanojevic (Serbia, MP): Received financial support to head the Serbian branch of the pro-Russian organization “Other Ukraine” and featured heavily on the FSB-linked Voice of Europe platform.
  • Andros Kyprianou (Cyprus, General Secretary of AKEL): Proposed a parliamentary motion to lift Russian sanctions that had been directly drafted by Russian intelligence-linked lobbyists, though he later claimed he was pressured by a Russian-Cypriot businessman and was unaware of the Kremlin’s coordination

We can be sure this is the tip of the iceberg. Here you have a paper (EN, FR, GR) on the issue and a explanatory video in Spanish (subtitled in English):