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MOROCCAN INFLUENCE NETWORKS



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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report assesses how Morocco's foreign intelligence service, the Directorate-General for Studies and Documentation (DGED), develops and sustains international influence networks intended to advance the kingdom's strategic objectives.

The analysis uses the Western Sahara dispute as its principal case study, focusing on Morocco's campaign to secure international support for its claim to the territory. Particular attention is given to the Spanish government's endorsement of Rabat's autonomy proposal, under which Western Sahara would be incorporated as an autonomous region subject to a referendum.

The study applies a reverse-tracing methodology, beginning with influential figures in the Spanish government who have consistently supported Rabat's position and then examining the networks surrounding them. Such alignment is politically notable in Spain, where perceptions of Morocco remain shaped by the colonial legacy and by the circumstances of Morocco's assumption of control over Western Sahara in 1975, during the final illness of Francisco Franco and a period of institutional weakness. Support for Rabat has nevertheless emerged across an unusually broad ideological spectrum, from the far left to the centre-right.

The report then maps the organisations that have advocated Moroccan interests and engaged with relevant figures in the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE). **These relationships indicate potential connections to the DGED.** Direct attribution remains difficult, as is typical in intelligence-related influence activity; however, the number and convergence of available indicators warrant closer scrutiny.

Only at the end of the study information revealed by the Spanish intelligence agency, the CNI, to the media, is used. The core of the study comes from OSINT and leaked emails.

2. SOCIALIST LEADERS TAKING PART IN EVENTS REGARDING THE WESTERN SAHARA

The clearest relationship is a sequence of public appearances at MSP (Movement of Saharawis for Peace) events held in 2022, 2023 and 2025. This continuity demonstrates political support for and gives visibility to the movement. The cited sources do not establish that the Spanish

participants belong to the MSP or that their appearances were commissioned by the PSOE.[2][4][6][7]

Leader and background	Documented relationship	Scope
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero Prime Minister of Spain, 2004–2011.	Participated in the MSP conference in Las Palmas in 2022 and contributed remotely by message to the Dakar 2023 and Las Palmas 2025 events. [2] [4] [6]	Public support for the dialogue promoted by the MSP and for an autonomy-based solution.
José Bono Former Minister of Defence and former President of the Congress of Deputies.	Participated in the MSP meetings held in 2022, 2023 and 2025. At the latest event, he stated that he was attending in a personal capacity. [2] [4] [6]	Repeated participation; does not establish formal representation of the PSOE.
Juan Fernando López Aguilar Former Minister of Justice and senior European socialist figure.	Participated in 2022 and sent video messages in 2023 and 2025. [2] [4] [6]	Political support and public presence within the MSP conference circuit.
Jerónimo Saavedra Former President of the Canary Islands and former socialist minister.	Appeared with Esparza at the December 2021 event in Las Palmas on Morocco's autonomy proposal. [8]	Political intermediary within the Canary Islands sphere; membership of the MSP is not established.
Rafael Esparza Machín Academic and former secretary-general of the PSOE in Las Palmas, according to his own account.	Chairs ACAMA (cooperation between the Canary Islands and Morocco) and defended before the United Nations the manifesto that emerged from the 2022 MSP conference. [9] [10]	A personal and organisational connection involving explicit political advocacy.
Pedro Sánchez Prime Minister of Spain since 2018; President of the Socialist International since November 2022.	Led the Spanish government's change of position in 2022; the MSP became an observer member of the Socialist International during his presidency. [1] [29] [30]	Governmental and institutional action; this alone does not establish an organisational relationship with ACAMA or Tariq.

Las Palmas, 22–23 September 2022. The meeting was held at the CICCA (a place for events owned by a local savings bank). Advance reports attributed its organisation to the MSP, in collaboration with the Sahrawi Canary Forum. Bono spoke on the first day, while Zapatero and López Aguilar participated on the second. The meeting provided the MSP with a platform for dialogue and concluded with the so-called Canary Islands Manifesto.[2][3]

Dakar, 27–28 October 2023. The second conference took place at the CICES. Bono attended, while Zapatero and López Aguilar contributed by video. Coverage identifies the involvement of CISPAIX, *Centre africain d'intelligence stratégique pour la paix*. [4] [5]

Las Palmas, 27 February 2025. The third conference again brought Bono to the event in person, with Zapatero and López Aguilar participating remotely. Esparza also spoke. Bono's statement that he attended in a personal capacity requires his support to be distinguished from that of an official PSOE delegation.[6][7]

2.1 Previous records: the Canary Islands link and Zapatero's government.

On 15 December 2021, Saavedra and Esparza participated in an ACAMA event in Las Palmas supporting the autonomy proposal. The MAP report also places Ahmed Lakhrif, a member of Morocco's House of Councillors, and Mohamed Salem Behiya, from the Tarfaya Provincial Council, at the event. The source confirms that the event took place and records the positions expressed; its language concerning the conflict reflects the official Moroccan perspective.[8]

There is also an institutional precedent from the Zapatero government: Royal Decree 53/2010 awarded Omar Azziman, then Morocco's ambassador to Spain, the Grand Cross of the Order of Isabella the Catholic. The award was approved on the proposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, following deliberation by the Council of Ministers, and countersigned by Miguel Ángel Moratinos, minister of Foreign Affairs. **It documents a formal diplomatic relationship with Azziman.**[28]

The MSP was established in April 2020, after Zapatero's governments. The subsequent participation of former ministers in its conferences is distinct from the actions of that government.[13]

2.2 The turning point in 2022.

The Spanish-Moroccan joint declaration of 7 April 2022 records Spain's assessment of the 2007 autonomy initiative as the most serious, credible and realistic basis for resolving the dispute. This alignment with the position of the conference organisers is politically relevant, but it does not establish that the government organised those meetings.[1]

One specific form of public support is documented: Las Palmas City Council paid €6,420 to hire the CICCA (*Centro de Iniciativas de La Caja de Canarias*, a place for events) for an ACAMA conference on a

solution for Western Sahara. Contract 1368-638-2022-S was awarded to the La Caja de Canarias Foundation on 21 September 2022 and was scheduled to run for two days. This was expenditure on facilities, not a direct grant to the MSP or a transfer to its leaders.[11][12]

The date, venue and stated purpose are consistent with the MSP meeting held on 22–23 September. **This is a significant documentary correspondence, but definitively establishing that the two events were the same would require the implementation file or explicit confirmation from the organiser. No complete budgets for the three conferences, travel or fee statements, or supporting documentation have been located that would allow their overall financing to be attributed to a Moroccan ministry or the Royal Palace.**

3. MSP, ACAMA AND SAHRAWI CANARY FORUM

Hach Ahmed Bericalla is the MSP's principal leader. He previously belonged to the Polisario Front and the Sahrawi Initiative for Change (ISC). The organisation's founding information from April 2020 identifies him as first secretary and places Fadel Breica—also spelt Breika—on the political committee. The MSP challenges the Polisario Front's claim to exclusive representation and promotes negotiations in which it can act as an interlocutor. The conferences described above constitute its principal public connection with the Spanish socialists examined in this report.[13][2][4]

Fadel Breica has also acted as a complainant in allegations of torture against Brahim Ghali and other Polisario officials. This case is different from the proceedings initiated by ASADEDH (*Asociación Saharawi para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos*, defending human rights).[14]

Rafael Esparza, president of ACAMA, provides the clearest link between a socialist political background, an association promoting cooperation with Morocco, and advocacy for the MSP. The record of the UN Fourth Committee meeting held in October 2022 identifies him as ACAMA's representative and records his support for the Canary Islands Manifesto. **The inclusion of his remarks in a United Nations record confirms that he made the intervention; it does not indicate UN endorsement of his position.**[9][10]

His activity continued: in a statement published in October 2025, signed in his capacity as president of the Canary Islands–Morocco Association for Cooperation and Friendship,

he advocated autonomy within Morocco and the inclusion of the MSP, alongside other Sahrawi actors, in future negotiations. [44]

Ignacio "Nacho" Ortiz is another connecting figure. The Sahrawi Canary Forum collaborated in the MSP's 2022 conference, and the 2025 programme identifies Ortiz as the Forum's president. In an article about the World Social Forum held in Mexico in May 2022, Ortiz describes activities promoting autonomy alongside Pedro Ignacio Altamirano, who is identified with Tariq Ibn Ziad (association). This establishes an overlap in public activities between the MSP network and Altamirano's network. [3][43][15]

4. ALTAMIRANO AND HIS ASSOCIATION

Pedro Ignacio Altamirano is publicly identified as the head of Tariq Ibn Ziad, an organisation promoting Spanish-Moroccan cooperation, and of an entity presented as the Pedro Ignacio Altamirano Foundation or Organisation. In Mexico, he advocated Morocco's autonomy proposal and historical arguments supporting Rabat's position. This activity establishes his position on the conflict. **However, no registry certificate has been provided that would justify automatically treating his organisation as a foundation registered under Spanish law.**[15][16]

The National Register of Associations record submitted for this research identifies the *Asociación Socio Cultural Benéfica Pedro Ignacio Altamirano Macarrón*, registration number 625,309, entered on 23 November 2022 and domiciled at Calle Moraima 8, Málaga. Its legal form is an association. Because the registration postdates the publication about Altamirano that appeared in April 2021, that publication cannot automatically be attributed to this legal entity.[80][74]

In July 2022, its website published a notice dated 7 July in Tangier announcing a cooperation agreement with AMILAC. The *Instituto Cervantes Hispanismo* portal identifies Omar Ajana as president and Karim Ben Allal as secretary-general of the *Asociación Marruecos Íbero Latino América y el Caribe para la cohesión de las civilizaciones y la fusión de las culturas* (AMILAC). This constitutes a documented cultural and organisational connection. References to royal speeches in an agreement do not establish sponsorship or funding by the Royal Palace.[16][17]

On 26 September 2022, the same website published an agreement with the *Association marocaine d'amitié avec la République dominicaine*, signed by Altamirano and Mokhtar Mrassli in the presence of Dominican diplomat Elsa María Domínguez. In

March 2024, *Diario Libre* identified Abdelmouneim Bounou as the association's president and reported an agreement with the *Club Diplomatique Maroc*. These are bilateral and cultural links. [18] [19]

Altamirano's agreements are preserved in copies of the original webpages, whose current accessibility proved unstable. They are used as statements by the entity, not as registered contracts or independent confirmation of every claim they contain.

5. ASADEDH, CORCAS AND THE LAWYER'S CLUB

Ramdan Mesaoud Larbi, also transcribed as Ramdane Messaoud, has been identified as president of ASADEDH, the Sahrawi Association for the Defence of Human Rights. The Moroccan press identified him as a member of CORCAS (*Consejo Real Consultivo para los Asuntos del Sahara*, royal counselling committee for Sahrawis affairs) in 2006. On 24 March 2011, it was reported that he had announced his resignation from the council the previous week, together with his rejection of the autonomy proposal. His historical membership is documented; evidence of its continuation thereafter would require further proof.[20][21]

It therefore cannot be asserted that he remained continuously affiliated with CORCAS solely on the basis of a historical directory or an alias containing its initials. Nor should his entire record be described as uniformly supportive of Rabat. His activity against Brahim Ghali is documented; his institutional and political position must be assessed by date.[14][21]

A separate connection with CORCAS concerns Saadani Maoulainine: Judge Ruz's April 2014 order lists her, alongside ASADEDH, among the complainants, while diplomatic documents from 2013 and 2014 describe her activities as a representative of the council. This overlap is examined later. Their participation in the same proceedings does not establish that Saadani was an officer or member of ASADEDH. [52][53][54][57]

Mourad Elajouti chairs the French-named *Club des avocats au Maroc*¹, which pursued legal action relating to Ghali's stay and documentation in Spain in 2021. A specific professional relationship with the Moroccan state is also documented: in September 2022, the Ministry of Youth, Culture and Communication instructed him to act against Adidas over a design it regarded as an appropriation of Moroccan

¹ This club as well as the CORCAS in Morocco are under the control and supervision of the security apparatus.

heritage. This mandate establishes that a ministry was his client in another matter; it does not establish the source of the club's funding or of all its activities.[22][23]

6. FURTHER LINKS

Connected persons or entities	Documented relationship
Zapatero / Bono / López Aguilar ↔ MSP	Repeated participation in conferences.[2][4][6]
Esparza / ACAMA → MSP	Explicit support for the 2022 manifesto and for the MSP's participation in negotiations.[9][44]
Sahrawi Canary Forum ↔ MSP	Collaboration in the 2022 conference.[3]
Ortiz ↔ Altamirano / Tariq	Overlapping activities promoting autonomy in Mexico in 2022.[15]
Altamirano ↔ AMILAC	Cooperation agreement announced in 2022.[16][17]
Altamirano ↔ Morocco–Dominican Republic friendship association	Agreement published in September 2022.[18]
ACAMA ↔ consulate / Ahmed Moussa	Collaboration in the Fuerteventura–Tarfaya event.[24]
Esparza / Saavedra ↔ Omar Azziman	Personal relationship described by Esparza. Azziman was appointed a royal adviser.[26][27]
Elajouti ↔ Moroccan Ministry of Culture	Professional mandate concerning Adidas, 2022. [23]
Mesaud ↔ CORCAS	Historical membership; public break in 2011.[20][21]

The cooperation between ACAMA and the Moroccan consulate is supported by an independent official source. On 15 November 2021, the Fuerteventura Island Council reported on an event organised by ACAMA, with consular cooperation, to restore the Fuerteventura–Tarfaya maritime route; Consul Ahmed Moussa attended. The event's purpose was economic and territorial. It documents institutional cooperation but does not make the event a conference on the status of Western Sahara. On 2 August 2022, Las Palmas City Council announced that Moussa would conclude his duties on 31 August.[24][25]

The connection with Omar Azziman comes from an account signed by Esparza in November 2024, in which he recalls his friendship and evenings spent with Azziman and Jerónimo Saavedra. A separate source—a Royal Household Ministry statement distributed by MAP—confirms Azziman’s appointment as an adviser to the King on 29 November 2011, after he had served as a minister and ambassador to Spain. **This documents a personal relationship with an individual whose career included ministerial office and, subsequently, a palace role.**[\[26\]](#)[\[27\]](#)

7. SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL UNDER SÁNCHEZ

Pedro Sánchez was elected president of the Socialist International (SI) at its congress held in Madrid from 25 to 27 November 2022. Zapatero participated as a special guest at the same congress. **The MSP’s subsequent admission establishes a verifiable institutional relationship, distinct from the personal participation of former government officials in its conferences.**[\[29\]](#)

The leader of MSP, Hach Ahmed, requested the adherence of his organization to the Socialist International in March 2023. In February 2024, announced contacts/negotiations to address this topic. **However, it was not until Sánchez became president of SI that MSP was not admitted.** In January 2025, MSP thanked the USFP (Socialist Party in Morocco) for its support and in May 2025, Hach Ahmed sent a letter to the SI thanking the leadership of Sánchez.[\[33\]](#)[\[37\]](#)

8. THE ROLE OF DGED AND DGST

The most concrete finding independent of the CNI is a set of minutes describing coordination among Morocco’s foreign and interior ministries and intelligence services to select and fund petitioners appearing before the United Nations Fourth Committee. The associated list identifies individuals who later appear in the public network examined in this report. ARSO retains copies attributed to the Chris Coleman leaks. Their content is specific, but the documents’ authenticity has not been independently verified in this investigation.[\[45\]](#)[\[46\]](#)[\[47\]](#)

The minutes refer to a meeting held on 1 August 2013 with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, the Ministry of the Interior and the DGED. They provide for the Interior Ministry to finalise the list of national candidates in collaboration with the DGST. They also specify themes for the interventions: autonomy, reforms, human rights in the camps, the census and security

in the Sahel. The distinction is important: the DGED appears as a participant in the coordination process and as a proposer of names, while the DGST is mentioned in connection with finalising the selection of national candidates. [46]

Regarding expenses, the document proposes that each department cover the costs of its candidates following hierarchical approval; travel and accommodation for those proposed by the Interior Ministry and the DGED would be arranged through an agency. It mentions an allowance of \$2,000 and an additional \$200 for airport-to-hotel transport, without sufficient basis to describe the \$2,000 as a daily amount. It also records a decision to avoid a joint meeting and dinner in New York in order to maintain discretion concerning links with Moroccan officials. [46]

The document records what its author presents as a mechanism for selection, messaging and expense coverage. It contains no receipts, transfers or evidence that individuals accepted those conditions. The planned discretion distinguishes the described mechanism from a merely public programme of contacts. [46][47]

The 2013 list includes "Chema Gil Jean jare" (José Manuel Gil Garre), identified with Spain and described as a journalist specialising in security, within the DGED group. The misspelling of the surname should be retained when describing the document. Another list from the same archive includes "Chema Gil", Spain, in row 33 on page 2, under the heading for petitioners proposed by the DGED. **This second match strengthens the identification, although two documents from the same collection do not constitute two independent authentications.** [47][48]

The public relationship with Rafael Esparza is supported by two contemporary sources. A MAP report published by Le Matin on 22 February 2011 places both men as speakers at a conference in Playa del Inglés organised by an entity named *Association culturelle canario-marocaine*. Another MAP report, dated 26 February 2014, identifies Esparza as accompanying Gil at the Madrid presentation of Gil's book on the Polisario Front the previous day. At that event, Gil defended Morocco's autonomy proposal. The report associates Esparza with the socialist sphere in Las Palmas. [49][50]

Gil also has a separate political connection: the Official Gazette of the Region of Murcia of 28 April 2015 lists José María Gil Garre as the leading candidate on the PSOE slate in Los Alcázares. That candidacy establishes a formal link with the party in that election. [84]

Official United Nations documentation provides an additional independent check: list A/C.4/69/5/Rev.1 records José María

Gil Garre, of the Global Security Institute, with a request dated 17 September and a hearing on 9 October 2014. This confirms his appearance as a petitioner during that period.[79]

The documented sequence is therefore: proposal attributed to the DGED → Chema Gil → events with Esparza → Esparza's presidency of ACAMA and support for the MSP. The overlap justifies investigating possible intermediation.[47][48][49][50][9][44]

The 2013 list places Mahjoub Salek, founder of Khat Achahid, a Sahrawi group opposed to the Polisario Front, in the same DGED group, with Spain listed as the country and the presidency of Khat Achahid as his profile. The entry concerns that individual and that proposed appearance. [47] [13]

On 23 September 2022, Le360 reported on a message sent by Salek to the MSP's first conference in Las Palmas. It identified him as the coordinator of Khat Achahid and reproduced his support for the movement as an interlocutor capable of reaching a negotiated solution with Morocco and the United Nations. [51]

The proposed DGED–Salek–MSP connection is more specific than a general affinity because it links a name in a document attributed to the service with subsequent support for the movement.[47][51]

9. THE CHARAÏ AFFAIR

The **Charaï affair** refers to allegations surrounding Moroccan media businessman **Ahmed Charaï**, who has long been reported as having close links to Morocco's foreign intelligence service, the DGED. The controversy intensified after leaked communications attributed to the so-called *Chris Coleman disclosures*² appeared to show Charaï acting as an intermediary in influence operations involving foreign journalists and opinion-makers, particularly to promote Morocco's position on Western Sahara.

He has also been associated with discreet contacts with political and security figures abroad, including in Spain, reinforcing suspicions that his media and international networks have served broader Moroccan influence and intelligence objectives. These allegations remain partly

² On 15 December 2014, Jean-Marc Manach published his investigation in *Arrêt sur images*. The twelve-page copy retained by ARSO states that he examined 58 EML files and verified cryptographic signatures in approximately twenty of them. Among the exchanges he regarded as authenticated was the one concerning payments.[64]

contested and should be distinguished from judicially established facts. [64] [65] [66]

A statement issued by L'Observateur on 22 December 2020 identifies Ahmed Charaï as chairman of Global Media Holding and the group as the publisher of the outlet. [73]

Page 7 of issue 564 of L'Observateur, dated 30 April–6 May 2021, features a video by Pedro Ignacio Altamirano released on 26 April. It presents him as spokesperson for the International Support Group for Sahrawi Reunification and Peace and amplifies his calls for judicial and parliamentary investigations into Brahim Ghali's arrival. **The documented relationship is the dissemination of his intervention by an outlet belonging to the group chaired by Charaï.** [74]

On 23 April 2021, L'Observateur published comments by María del Rosario Villa, ASADEDH's lawyer, concerning the legal claims against Ghali. The page expressly identifies La Razón as its source. The Spanish report was written by Bárbara Barón. [75] [76]

On 12 March 2023, L'Observateur's editor, Hakim Arif, acknowledged numerous contacts with Bárbara Barón and the assistance she had provided to the outlet. **In the same editorial, he denied any financial motive and rejected the assertion that this collaboration demonstrated work for an intelligence service.** [77]

On 24 September 2022, Mohammed Zainabi published a favourable account of the MSP's first conference in Las Palmas in L'Observateur. He reproduced its manifesto and highlighted the participation of Zapatero, Bono and López Aguilar. [78]

10. WHAT THE CNI SAYS

El País reported on 7 June 2022³ about a CNI classified memo dated on 24 June 2021 (it was one year old). The CNI report stated that MSP and ISC were front organizations for the DGED. It also said that Fadel Breica (political committee of MSP) was paid by the DGED and that his trip to Tindouf in 2019 had been carried out as instructed by the DGED. [39]

Other attributions by the CNI:

Subject	Attribution reported by El País	Recorded response
ASADEDH / Ramdan Mesaud	Directed by the DGED through its president. [40]	Mesaud denied the connection.

³ It was leaked by the CNI after the avalanche against Ceuta that took place on May 2021, when Morocco funnelled 10,000 migrants from Moroccan territory into Ceuta (one of the Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco).

Pedro Ignacio Altamirano	Long-standing collaboration with Moroccan intelligence. [40]	He described the report as surreal.
Mourad Elajouti / Lawyers' Club	Moroccan services were behind the legal action against Ghali. [40]	Elajouti denied the connection.

11. WHAT IS CONFIRMED?

Zapatero, Bono and López Aguilar publicly supported the MSP through participation in its conferences. Esparza links this sphere to ACAMA and to events shared with Chema Gil; Gil also appeared on a PSOE electoral list in 2015. These instances of participation and the positions held constitute identifiable relationships. They do not, by themselves, establish that the PSOE directed those interventions or that the Spanish participants were aware of any possible intelligence affiliation involving their interlocutors. [2][4][6][9][50][84]

Moroccan institutional links are also supported by specific evidence: ACAMA collaborated with the consulate; Esparza described his friendship with Azziman, a royal adviser since 2011; Elajouti received a ministerial mandate in a defined matter; and Saadani appears in CORCAS activities. This is supplemented by Mourad Ghoul's position within the DGED, as recorded in a 2009 publication hosted by the CCME. These facts should remain confined to their subject and date and should not automatically be extended to other associates or activities. [24][26][27][23][58][63]

The MSP obtained observer status in the Socialist International during Sánchez's presidency, with political support from the USFP according to the cited sources. The 2013 strategic precedent concerning contacts within the SI provides additional context, but it does not document the reasons for decisions taken more than a decade later. [30][33][60]

11.1 Indicators of intelligence agencies involvement

The 2013 minutes describe a mechanism involving the DGED and DGST in the selection of petitioners and projected expenditure. The reference to the DGST is limited to the selection of national candidates; it does not establish a direct, named link with the Spanish associations examined. The list names Gil and Salek, whose subsequent or parallel contacts bring the mechanism attributed to the services closer to individuals within the sphere studied. A reasonable inference is that these trajectories warrant comparison with the records of participation and financing. **The material does not, however,**

support the inference that Esparza, ACAMA or the MSP received instructions or funding from those services on that basis.[46][47][50][51]

In Charaï's case, the additional evidential value lies in the content of the messages, the public identification of Ghoul's position and the judicial examination of the factual basis of reporting about those emails. The connection with the Spanish associations is established through media coverage of Altamirano, ASADEDH's legal position and the MSP. What remains absent is a communication or payment linking these two strands. The outlet and the chairman of its parent group cannot be treated as interchangeable when attributing individual editorial decisions.[63][64][70][74][75][78]

The Saadani-ASADEDH-CORCAS-Foreign Ministry connection is institutional and procedural, while the embassy's monitoring adds evidence of diplomatic interest in the litigation. These documents do not identify a DGED or DGST operation directed at the association. Nor can CORCAS be equated with an intelligence service.[52][53][55][56]



SOURCE REGISTER

- [1] **Governments of Spain and Morocco.** Joint Declaration. 7 April 2022. Official document, section on Western Sahara. [Consult source](#)
- [2] **Atalayar, Álvaro Escalonilla.** Report on the MSP's first conference and Hach Ahmed's proposal. 23 September 2022. Report on an event held; the page shows a later update. [Consult source](#)
- [3] **Atalayar.** Announcement of the peace and security conference on Western Sahara. 2 September 2022. Identifies the MSP and the collaboration of the Sahrawi Canary Forum. [Consult source](#)
- [4] **Atalayar, Javier Fernández Arribas.** Report on the Dakar conference and support for the MSP. 27–30 October 2023. Distinguishes between physical attendance and video messages. [Consult source](#)
- [5] **Agence Afrique.** Opening of the MSP's second conference in Dakar. October 2023. Information on CISPAX's involvement. [Consult source](#)
- [6] **Canarias Ahora / elDiario.es, Gara Santana.** Bono and the MSP conference in Gran Canaria. 27 February 2025. News report and statement that he participated in a personal capacity. [Consult source](#)
- [7] **Atalayar.** Dialogue and understanding at the MSP's third conference. 28 February 2025; updated 1 March. Post-event report covering interventions and participants. [Consult source](#)
- [8] **Le Reporter / MAP.** Event in Las Palmas on Morocco's autonomy proposal. 17 December 2021. Report by Morocco's official news agency on the event held on 15 December. [Consult source](#)
- [9] **United Nations.** Summary record of the Fourth Committee, A/C.4/77/SR.5. October 2022. Paragraph 23: intervention by Rafael Esparza on behalf of ACAMA. It records his position without making it the position of the UN. [Consult source](#)
- [10] **Rafael Esparza / Atalayar.** Autonomy for Western Sahara. 9 October 2022. Intervention published by its author; includes his socialist background. [Consult source](#)
- [11] **Las Palmas de Gran Canaria City Council.** List of low-value contracts for 2022. Financial year 2022. Page 14: file 1368-638-2022-S, CICC facilities, ACAMA, €6,420. [Consult source](#)
- [12] **Public Sector Procurement Platform.** Award of file 1368-638-2022-S. Awarded 21 September 2022; published 17 October. Official XML notice retained for this research: two-day duration and awardee Fundación La Caja de Canarias. [Consult source](#)
- [13] **Yabiladi.** Establishment and leadership of Sahraouis pour la paix. 27 April 2020. Report based on the MSP's founding statement. [Consult source](#)
- [14] **Europa Press.** Fadel Breica's judicial statement concerning his allegations of torture. 29 June 2021. Distinguishes Breica's complaint from that brought by ASADEDH. [Consult source](#)
- [15] **Ignacio Ortiz / Atalayar.** Promotion of autonomy at the World Social Forum in Mexico. 5 May 2022. Account signed by a participant; mentions Altamirano and Tariq Ibn Ziad. [Consult source](#)
- [16] **Pedro Ignacio Altamirano website.** Cooperation agreement with AMILAC in Tangier. Note dated 7 July 2022; published on 10 July. Interested-party source; HTML copy retained. The original link could not be retrieved reliably during review. [Consult source](#)
- [17] **Instituto Cervantes, Hispanismo portal.** AMILAC association profile. Undated; accessed 16 October 2026. Institutional directory containing information supplied by the organisation. [Consult source](#)
- [18] **Pedro Ignacio Altamirano website.** Agreement with the Moroccan friendship association with the Dominican Republic. 26 September 2022. Interested-party source; HTML copy retained. The original link could not be retrieved reliably during review. [Consult source](#)
- [19] **Diario Libre.** Celebration of Dominican independence in Morocco. 3 March 2024. Identifies Bounou and the agreement with Club Diplomatique Maroc. [Consult source](#)
- [20] **Le Matin.** CORCAS intervention in Geneva. 2006. Historically identifies Ramdan Mesaoud as a council member. [Consult source](#)
- [21] **Europa Press.** Mesaoud distances himself from CORCAS and supports self-determination. 24 March 2011. Report of his public break with the autonomy proposal. [Consult source](#)
- [22] **Médias24.** Reaction of the Club des avocats au Maroc to the Ghali case. 1 June 2021. Information on the legal initiatives and the club's statement. [Consult source](#)

- [23] **SNRTnews**. Mandate given to Mourad Elajouti concerning the Adidas design. 29 September 2022. Moroccan public media outlet; identifies the Ministry of Youth, Culture and Communication as the client. [Consult source](#)
- [24] **Fuerteventura Island Council**. Event on the Fuerteventura–Tarfaya maritime connection. 15 November 2021. Official source: organised by ACAMA with the cooperation of the Moroccan consulate. [Consult source](#)
- [25] **Las Palmas de Gran Canaria City Council**. Farewell to Consul-General Ahmed Moussa. 2 August 2022. Official source: announces that he would leave office on 31 August. [Consult source](#)
- [26] **Rafael Esparza / Atalayar**. Spanish-Moroccan relations: Western Sahara as the backdrop. 12 November 2024. Personal account concerning Omar Azziman and Jerónimo Saavedra. [Consult source](#)
- [27] **MAP / Le Matin**. Appointment of Omar Azziman as a royal adviser. 29 November 2011. Reproduces the statement of the Ministry of the Royal Household. [Consult source](#)
- [28] **Spanish Official State Gazette**. Royal Decree 53/2010: decoration awarded to Omar Azziman. 22 January 2010; published in the Gazette on 23 January. BOE-A-2010-1057. Proposed by the Foreign Ministry and deliberated by the Council of Ministers; signed by Miguel Ángel Moratinos. [Consult source](#)
- [29] **Socialist International**. XXVI Congress, Madrid. 25–27 November 2022. Institutional report: Sánchez's election and Zapatero's intervention. [Consult source](#)
- [30] **Socialist International**. Membership directory. Accessed 16 October 2026. Primary source for the categories assigned to the MSP, Polisario Front and USFP; the page may be updated. [Consult source](#)
- [31] **Atalayar**. Formal MSP application to join the Socialist International. 19 March 2023. Information on Hach Ahmed's letter to Benedicta Lasi. [Consult source](#)
- [32] **MSP**. Delegation in connection with the Socialist International Council. 25 February 2024. Interested-party statement; it does not by itself establish membership status. [Consult source](#)
- [33] **Libération, Morocco**. Admission of the MSP to the Socialist International. 9 January 2025. Newspaper linked to the USFP; records thanks to Driss Lachgar. [Consult source](#)
- [34] **Socialist International**. Council meeting in Rabat. 21–22 December 2024. Official report: USFP as host, Driss Lachgar and Pedro Sánchez. [Consult source](#)
- [35] **Socialist International**. Presidium directory. Accessed 16 October 2026. Institutional source listing Khaoula Lachgar of the USFP. [Consult source](#)
- [36] **MSP**. Participation of its delegation in the SI women's congress. 23 May 2025. Interested-party statement: contacts with Janet Camilo and Hend Mgaiteh. [Consult source](#)
- [37] **MSP**. Hach Ahmed's letter concerning admission to the Socialist International. 31 May 2025. Direct source for his expression of thanks to the organisation and assessment of Sánchez. [Consult source](#)
- [38] **MSP**. Delegation to the Malta Council. 29 November 2025. Interested-party statement naming the members of the delegation. [Consult source](#)
- [39] **Público, José Bautista and Nacho Calle**. Request by Ghali's defence concerning intelligence reports. 9 June 2022; updated 10 June. Journalistic account attributed to two CNI reports; these are not the complete documents. [Consult source](#)
- [40] **El País, José Bautista and Óscar López-Fonseca**. Judicial and media campaign against the Polisario leader. 7 June 2022. Journalistic attributions to the CNI and responses from those concerned. The original article is cited, not an alleged complete report. [Consult source](#)
- [41] **Hach Ahmed Bericalla / Atalayar**. Response to reporting attributed to the CNI. 8 June 2022. Interested-party article rejecting the description of the MSP as a front organisation. [Consult source](#)
- [42] **Europa Press**. Pedraz rejects the request to obtain the reports sought by Ghali. 27 June 2022. Procedural information: lack of relevance to the case, without a ruling on the substance of the attributions. [Consult source](#)
- [43] **Atalayar**. Programme of the third international conference on Western Sahara. 24 February 2025. Identifies Ignacio Ortiz as president of the Sahrawi Canary Forum. [Consult source](#)
- [44] **Rafael Esparza / Atalayar**. Western Sahara: now or never. 10 October 2025; intervention delivered on 9 October. Signed in his capacity as president of ACAMA; advocates autonomy and MSP participation. [Consult source](#)

[45] **ARSO.** Coleman Papers. Accessed 16 October 2026. Catalogue of copies attributed to leaks. Hosting and metadata do not authenticate their origin. [Consult source](#)

[46] **Document attributed to the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and retained by ARSO.** Minutes concerning the selection of Fourth Committee petitioners. Meeting held on 1 August 2013. Word file. Identifies the foreign and interior ministries, DGED and DGST collaboration; provides for expenditure subject to approval. The year is inferred from the 68th session and the subsequent meeting scheduled for 5 August 2013. [Consult source](#)

[47] **Document attributed to the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and retained by ARSO.** Proposed list of petitioners for the 68th General Assembly. 2013. "Pétitionnaires DGED" section: Chema Gil and Mahjoub Salek. It is not a list of employees or agents. [Consult source](#)

[48] **Document retained by ARSO.** List of petitioners proposed by the Interior Ministry and DGED. No visible date on the list. Page 2, row 33: Chema Gil, Spain, within the section proposed by the DGED. Page 1: Saadani Maoulainine among the national candidates in the Interior Ministry section. ARSO catalogues it under 2014. [Consult source](#)

[49] **MAP / Le Matin.** Importance des grands chantiers lancés par le Maroc. 22 February 2011. Interventions by Chema Gil and Rafael Esparza in Playa del Inglés. Organiser identified as Association culturelle canario-marocaine. [Consult source](#)

[50] **MAP / Le Matin.** Création algérienne et menace internationale. 26 February 2014. Presentation of Chema Gil's book in Madrid on 25 February, accompanied by Rafael Esparza. [Consult source](#)

[51] **Le360, Ayoub Khattabi.** Message from Mahjoub Salek to the MSP conference. 23 September 2022. Reproduces statements of support sent on 22 September. Moroccan press favourable to Rabat's position; no signed message or recording is available. [Consult source](#)

[52] **Central Court of Investigation No. 5, Pablo Ruz.** Order in preliminary proceedings 1/2008 A. 15 April 2014. Complete judicial copy hosted by El País. Pages 1–2: ASADEDH and Saadani Maoulainine among the complainants. Page 7: continuation of the investigation, not a conviction. [Consult source](#)

[53] **Document attributed to the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and retained by ARSO.** Cable 482 concerning a CORCAS delegation to Geneva. 10 May 2013. Requests assistance from the mission in Geneva and the embassy in Bern for Moulay Ahmed Mghizlate and Saadani. Signed in the name of Mohammed Amine Belhaj. [Consult source](#)

[54] **Document attributed to the Moroccan Embassy in Bern.** Visit of two CORCAS officials to Switzerland. 28 May 2013. No. 245, signed in the name of Mohamed Balbacha. Pages 1 and 3 describe meetings and testimony; the reproduction contains truncated passages. [Consult source](#)

[55] **Document attributed to the Moroccan Embassy in Madrid.** Cable 227 concerning summonses issued by Judge Ruz. 11 August 2013. Signed in the name of Mohamed Boulmani. Monitoring of the case and proceedings concerning Saadani and other complainants; it contains no instruction to finance or direct ASADEDH. [Consult source](#)

[56] **Document attributed to the Moroccan Embassy in Madrid.** Cable 229 concerning the suspension of statements. 14 August 2013. Reports notification problems. Document from the same diplomatic channel as cable 227. [Consult source](#)

[57] **Document attributed to the Moroccan mission in Geneva.** Cable 1666 concerning Saadani's activities and civil organisations. 17 June 2014. Page 1: Saadani as a CORCAS member at an event with OCAPROCE and other African NGOs. Forwarded to the foreign ministry and signed in the name of Hassane Boukili. [Consult source](#)

[58] **CORCAS.** Report on Saadani at the Human Rights Council. 26 September 2013. The official index identifies Saadani as the CORCAS representative in the Moroccan delegation. Text retrieved through the search index; direct access was unstable. [Consult source](#)

[59] **Document attributed to Omar Hilale and retained by ARSO.** Geneva action plan. 2 January 2014. Page 2, section F: requests CHF 10,000 annually per NGO, CHF 60,000 in total. It neither identifies the beneficiaries nor establishes implementation. [Consult source](#)

[60] **Diplomatic document retained by ARSO.** Action plan for Latin America. 2013. Page 3: Hach Ahmed presented as a diplomatic adversary. Page 13: USFP and PPS contacts within the Socialist International. [Consult source](#)

[61] **Document attributed to Mounir El Jaffali, Moroccan House of Representatives.** Compte rendu de mission du 20 au 24 juin 2013. June 2013. Page 1: Muñiz and Moreno Sánchez with the foreign ministry and parliament. Pages 2–4: meetings also held with critics of Morocco. Page 5: logistical support in the form of vehicles. [Consult source](#)

[62] **Document attributed to the Moroccan mission to the EU.** Action plan concerning the European Parliament. 4 January 2013. Page 5: official, parliamentary and civil-society channels. Proposal submitted for approval; it does not identify the Spanish associations examined. [Consult source](#)

[63] **International University of Rabat, document hosted by the CCME.** Summary of the conference on the diaspora and higher education. 25 April 2009. Page 25: Mourad Ghoul, chief of staff at the Direction Générale des Etudes et de la Documentation. Official corroboration of the position, not of the user of an email account. [Consult source](#)

[64] **Jean-Marc Manach / Arrêt sur images.** Quatre journalistes français auraient été instrumentalisés par le Maroc. 15 December 2014. Twelve-page copy retained by ARSO. Pages 2–4 and 6: analysis of messages and its limitations. The PDF does not retain links to the native package of 58 emails. [Consult source](#)

[65] **Chris Coleman 24 account, Internet Archive capture.** Publication of a reproduction of an email attributed to Charaï. Captured 31 December 2014. Context for publication of the image; it is not equivalent to a native email with verifiable headers. [Consult source](#)

[66] **Chris Coleman 24 account, archived image.** Email to Si Mourad containing forwarded text attributed to Richard Minitier. Forwarded message dated 2 May 2012. Reproduction mentioning \$20,000. A screenshot cannot verify the forwarding or that payment was made. [Consult source](#)

[67] **Demain Online, image retained by the Internet Archive.** Extract from a message attributed to Charaï. 2 October 2011. Partial reproduction of correspondence concerning travel and payments. The filename does not constitute an expert authentication. [Consult source](#)

[68] **Ali Lmrabet.** Thread reproducing emails attributed to Charaï. 27 February 2023. Later republication of screenshots retained by Thread Reader. It is distinct from the original act of leaking. [Consult source](#)

[69] **Image republished by Ali Lmrabet.** Message attributed to Charaï concerning funding for think tanks. 7 September 2011. Mentions CSIS, Search for Common Ground and FPRI. Red annotations added to the image are not part of the email. It is not evidence of payments to Spanish associations. [Consult source](#)

[70] **Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, circulated working copy.** Judgment in proceedings concerning reporting on Charaï's emails. 22 March 2018. 21 pages. Pages 17–19: assessment of the factual basis and good faith. Copy circulated on SlideShare, not a certified copy. Charaï was not convicted in this judgment. [Consult source](#)

[71] **Le Desk.** MarocLeaks épilogue à Paris de l'affaire Charaï. 9 July 2018. Public introduction reporting a final acquittal; it is not presented as a judicial certificate of finality. [Consult source](#)

[72] **Madrid Press Association.** Dismissal of the lawsuit against Ignacio Cembrero. 6 November 2015. Statement concerning the Spanish proceedings. It is not a substitute for the complete text of the ruling. [Consult source](#)

[73] **L'Observateur.** Statement concerning the chairmanship of Global Media Holding. 22 December 2020. Source from the group itself identifying Ahmed Charaï as chairman. [Consult source](#)

[74] **L'Observateur, issue 564.** Article on Pedro Ignacio Altamirano. 30 April–6 May 2021. Page 7 of the magazine: dissemination of his public intervention. Copy retained by Le1. [Consult source](#)

[75] **L'Observateur.** La Razón appels au jugement de Brahim Ghali en Espagne. 23 April 2021. Reproduction identifying La Razón as the source; reports the position of ASADEDH's lawyer and a CORCAS tweet. [Consult source](#)

[76] **La Razón, Bárbara Barón.** Report containing comments by María Rosario Villa. April 2021. The URL contains 23 April, while the page shows creation on 24 April. L'Observateur's reproduction is dated 23 April. This editorial discrepancy is retained. [Consult source](#)

[77] **Hakim Arif / L'Observateur.** Editorial concerning Ignacio Cembrero and Bárbara Barón. 12 March 2023. The editor acknowledges contacts with Barón and assistance she provided to the outlet; he rejects financial motives and the interpretation that this amounted to espionage. His testimony is cited without using CNI attributions. [Consult source](#)

[78] **Mohammed Zainabi / L'Observateur.** Las Palmas un manifeste pour la réunification de tous les Sahraouis. 24 September 2022. Favourable coverage of the MSP's first conference. It does not establish organisation or funding by Charaï. [Consult source](#)

[79] **United Nations.** List of petitioners A/C.4/69/5/Rev.1. 2014. Page 4 of the English version: José María Gil Garre, Global Security Institute, request dated 17 September and hearing on 9 October 2014. It does not identify the funder or proposer. [Consult source](#)

[80] National Register of Associations, Ministry of the Interior. National record 625309. Registered 23 November 2022. Screenshot supplied by the requester on 16 October 2026: Asociación Socio Cultura Benéfica Pedro Ignacio Altamirano Macarrón, registered address at Calle Moraima 8, Málaga. The screenshot concerns an association, not a foundation. [Consult source](#)

[81] Document attributed to the Moroccan mission to the EU. Contacts involving a parliamentary delegation. 31 January–2 February 2012. Pages 4–5: Andrés Barea, Moreno Sánchez, Romero López and Ayala Sender. The contact with Ayala is shown as arranged by Agriculture and Fisheries. [Consult source](#)

[82] Morocco–EU Joint Parliamentary Committee, copy retained by ARSO. Rapport biennal 2012–2013. 2012–2013. Physical pages 54–60: list of MEPs with whom it states interviews were held, including Romero, García Hierro, Sánchez Presedo and Muñiz. [Consult source](#)


[83] Historical link circulated with the leaks. emails ahmed Charai doc. 2014. Historical reference retained; returned a 404 during verification. It is not a working link to the package of 58 EML files. [Consult source](#)

[84] Official Gazette of the Region of Murcia. Proclamation of municipal candidacies in Los Alcázares. 28 April 2015. BORM No. 96, notice 5185, page 17494. José María Gil Garre appears as the first candidate on the PSOE list. [Consult source](#)

1. Political relations

Visual Annex 1: Political and Associative Relations

Each link expresses a specific documented relationship. Participation in events does not imply affiliation or official representation of the PSOE.




The agreements with AMILAC and the Dominican association correspond to the Altamirano organization. Affiliation of these partners to the MSP is not asserted.

Report references: [2] [3] [4] [6] [8] [9] [10] [13] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [29] [30] [33] [43] [44]

Visual Annex 2: Connections with Moroccan Institutions


Public relations with institutions, dated and with their scope. The dotted line represents a personal testimony.



The relationship with Azziman does not prove a mandate or funding from the Royal House. The historical relationship with CORCAS includes the rupture announced in 2011.
Report references: [20] [21] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27]

Visual Annex 3: Published Attributions about the CNI

The red dashed lines represent journalistic attributions to the CNI, rejected by those concerned; they are not legally established facts.




Sources: Público and El País, June 2022 [39, 40]. Responses and procedural context: [41, 42].

The complete reports have not been examined. These attributions do not extend to the politicians, to Tariq, ACAMA, or AMILAC. See Chapter 7 and the responses of those affected.
Report references: [39] [40] [41] [42]

Visual Annex 4: Petitioners Gil, Salek and Spanish Connections

The dashed line represents what is described in the copies attributed to leaks. The blue lines describe independent public relations.



The links do not convey a relation of command or financing between the parties.

— Public relation or official document


- - - Leaked copy or attributed email content

The proposal of one person and their subsequent relationship with another **does not prove a mandate to the latter**. Dates delimit each segment.

References: [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [84] [9]

Visual Annex 5: Charaï and the Dissemination of the Studied Entities

Ghoul's position and the group's presidency are publicly sourced. The identification of the email interlocutor retains the reservations explained in Chapter 5.



No mandate or transfer of emails to these Spanish entities has been identified.

— Public relation or official document


----- Leaked copy or attributed email content

The coverage by L'Observateur proves dissemination. It does not prove that Charaï directed, financed, or maintained personal contact with each cited person or association.

References: [63] [64] [70] [73] [74] [75] [76] [78]

Visual Annex 6: CORCAS, ASADEDH and the Spanish Procedure

Procedural facts and official publications are distinguished from the details contained in leaked diplomatic cables.



The auto (court order) joins ASADEDH and Saadani as co-plaintiffs. It does not prove affiliation or management of the association.

CORCAS is a royal consultative institution. These documents do not equate it to DGED or DGST.

The links do not convey a relation of command or financing between the parties.

— Public relation or official document

- - - - -

- - - - - Leaked copy or attributed email content

The connection of ASADEDH with CORCAS is articulated here through a co-plaintiff and a historical membership of Mesaud; not through a proven organic dependence.

References: [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [28] [21]