2026

UKRAINIAN ATTACKS IN RUSSIA

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10-07-2026

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1. SCOPE

In this paper we will analyse the attacks that Ukraine has been carrying out **within the borders of Russia in 2026 against energy infrastructure.** These attacks have been increasing since the outbreak of the war in February 2022.

The information is scattered. It has to be gathered from different sources and verify them. The evolution of the **verified attacks per month** in 2026 is as follows:



The trend is **clearly on the rise,** but it has to do with the seasons (weather) but also with intelligence sharing among Ukraine and its allies.

2. NUMBERS

In different media the attacks in Russia from Ukraine in 2026 amount to 194 actions. However, we have been able to verify 49 of them (against energy infrastructure).

Metric	Value
Reported attack events	49
Unique geocoded facilities	41
Top region	Krasnodar Krai
Top target category	Refinery
Most repeated facility	Tuapse Refinery

Some facilities have been repeatedly attacked. The type of infrastructures attacked are:

Target category	Events	Share
Refinery	28	57,1%
Port/terminal/logistics	12	24,5%
Depot/storage	5	10,2%
Gas processing/condensate	2	4,1%
Pumping/pipeline	1	2,0%
Other/unspecified oil infrastructure	1	2,0%



Regarding the areas attacked:

Region	Events	Share
Krasnodar Krai	13	26,5%
Leningrad Oblast	5	10,2%
Samara Oblast	5	10,2%
Moscow	3	6,1%
Yaroslavl Oblast	3	6,1%
Perm Krai	2	4,1%
St Petersburg	2	4,1%
Tatarstan	2	4,1%
Occupied Crimea	2	4,1%
Volgograd Oblast	1	2,0%
Komi Republic	1	2,0%
Saratov Oblast	1	2,0%
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast	1	2,0%
Astrakhan Oblast	1	2,0%
Ryazan Oblast	1	2,0%
Moscow Oblast	1	2,0%
Rostov Oblast	1	2,0%
Tyumen Oblast	1	2,0%
Bashkortostan	1	2,0%
Orenburg Oblast	1	2,0%
Omsk Oblast	1	2,0%

And if we pay attention to the distance from Ukraine:

Approx distance to UA border	Events
<250 km	12
250–499 km	11
500–749 km	7
750–999 km	10
1,000–1,499 km	6
1,500–1,999 km	2
≥2,000 km	1

What it seems very clear, regarding the distances, that installations **within 1,000 kilometres** from Ukraine are the most attacked, representing over **80% of the actions.**

The attacks cluster around four major logistical corridors. This indicates that Ukraine is targeting **transport corridors**, not isolated industrial sites.

Corridor	Importance
Black Sea	Tuapse, Novorossiysk, Taman, Temryuk
Baltic	Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Vysotsk, St Petersburg
Volga industrial belt	Samara, Syzran, Kuibyshev, Perm, Ufa
Moscow hub	Kapotnya refinery, Solnechnogorsk

These are the four *oblast* which are the most attacked:



3. ATTACKS AND DEFENCE CAPABILITIES

The Ukrainian attacks have been carried out despite Russian air defences. We have also worked on the presence of Russian anti-air capabilities in order to analyse if those capabilities have been efficient or if Ukrainian intelligence efforts have been successful.

Moscow region is one of the most attacked, but it is also one of the best defended. It exposes that Russian anti-air capabilities have been overrun but Ukrainian capabilities.

We now know from publicly documented operations that the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has demonstrated the capability to:

- move drones covertly into Russia,
- conceal them in civilian-looking cargo,
- assemble launch systems inside Russia,
- launch very close to the target.

The clearest example is **Operation Spiderweb** (June 2025), where drones hidden in trucks were launched from locations close to Russian airbases rather than flown from Ukraine. Public reporting indicates drones concealed in trucks emerged near the target airfields after being smuggled into Russia.

This demonstrated a completely different operational model from traditional long-range drone launches.

This capability involves a great intelligence work and logistics within Russia.

Tuapse refinery and its oil terminal have been attacked four times:

Date_2026	Facility	Region	Target
Apr 16	Tuapse Refinery	Krasnodar Krai	Refinery
Apr 28	Tuapse Refinery	Krasnodar Krai	Refinery
May 1	Tuapse Oil Terminal	Krasnodar Krai	Port/terminal/logistics
May 27	Tuapse Refinery	Krasnodar Krai	Refinery

However, **there is no air defence capabilities within 72 kilometres** around those facilities. Probability of detection of the attacks in Tuapse area is very low.

But the presence of air defence capabilities within 50 kilometres from the target **has not prevented the Ukrainians from success:**

2026	Facility	Region	Target	AD_sites_within_50km
May 16–17	Kapotnya Refinery	Moscow	Refinery	**22**
May 16–17	Solnechnogorskaya Pumping Station	Moscow Oblast	Depot/storage	**13**
June 2–3	St Petersburg Refinery / Oil Terminal Area	St Petersburg	Refinery	**16**
June 16	Kapotnya Refinery	Moscow	Refinery	**22**
June 18	Kapotnya Refinery	Moscow	Refinery	**22**

Kapotnya refinery has been attacked three times in Moscow despite **there are 22 sites with air defence capabilities within 50 kilometres.** Actually, the nearest installation lies 7.5 kilometres away from the refinery.

It means that **Ukrainians can foil Russian anti-air capabilities.**

4. CONCLUSIONS

Russian media often claim, and some Western commentary repeats, that Ukraine's attacks are primarily designed to create instability inside Russia by generating public unease and weakening popular attachment to the regime. **That interpretation is too narrow.**

In practice, **Ukraine appears to be using these strikes to disrupt the logistical system that sustains Russian military operations in Ukraine.** Tanks, trucks, helicopters and ships lose operational value when fuel supply, storage and transport networks are degraded. **The main objective is therefore to undermine Russia's ability to move, supply and fight, while any fear among the local population or disruption to civilian fuel services remains a secondary effect.**

The geographical distribution of attacks indicates a sustained strategy aimed at degrading critical elements of Russia's petroleum system rather than causing isolated damage. The repeated targeting of the same facilities suggests that Ukraine seeks to impose persistent operational disruption instead of achieving one-off destruction.

More than half of the recorded attacks are directed against oil refineries, making refining infrastructure by far the dominant category.

This choice is logical because refineries represent a critical bottleneck where crude oil is transformed into products required by both civilian and military consumers:

- diesel fuel
- aviation fuel
- gasoline
- lubricants

Unlike crude production, **refining capacity is geographically concentrated** and significantly more difficult to replace rapidly.

Facilities such as Tuapse, Kapotnya and Syzran have been attacked multiple times.

This pattern suggests that Ukraine is attempting to:

- interrupt repair cycles
- force repeated shutdowns
- increase maintenance costs
- reduce infrastructure availability over extended periods

The objective appears to be sustained degradation rather than complete destruction.

The attacks extend from the Black Sea to western Siberia.

This suggests that target value has become a more important determinant than distance.

Deep strikes against facilities such as Omsk demonstrate that Ukrainian long-range strike capabilities have expanded considerably during 2026.

The available evidence does not support the conclusion that Russian air defence is ineffective.

Instead, it suggests that Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to penetrate or circumvent parts of a layered defence system.

Several observations support this assessment:

- **Russia continues to intercept a large proportion** of incoming drones during many large-scale attacks.
- The number of drones reportedly launched frequently **exceeds the number that reach** their intended targets.
- This indicates that **Russian air-defence systems remain operational** and impose a meaningful attrition rate.

The recurrence of successful attacks against previously targeted facilities suggests that **interception alone has not eliminated the threat to critical infrastructure.**

Satellite imagery and intelligence on the Russian air defence layered capabilities must be provided to Ukraine and it means that Western allies, U.S. included, are cooperating.

4.1 Assessment

The available evidence indicates that **Ukraine has conducted a sustained campaign against Russia's petroleum logistics network,** concentrating on refining, storage and export nodes that have disproportionate strategic importance. The campaign demonstrates an **emphasis on repeated disruption of critical infrastructure** rather than isolated symbolic attacks.

> At the same time, the attacks show that **Russia's extensive air-defence network has not been able to provide complete protection** for strategically significant energy facilities. The persistence of successful strikes against high-value targets—including sites near Moscow and deep inside the Russian Federation—suggests that **Ukraine has been able to adapt its strike methods sufficiently to impose continuing operational and economic costs,** even though **Russian air defences continue to intercept many incoming drones and remain a substantial obstacle rather than a failed system.**

NATO summit in Turkey has finalised **without unpleasant surprises from Russia** although it was announced that some preparations might indicate that such an event might take place in Poland, for instance.

Iran has taken the lead and the attention. Putin has preferred to stay in the dark. There was nothing to win for him.

5. ANNEX. MAP OF ATTACKS AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS