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IRANIAN SCENARIOS



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1. FOREWORD

We have analysed the situation in the Middle East by using a simple Markov chain. Although the matrix (4x4) might seem simple to analyse such a geostrategic conundrum, we find that it may give some ideas by reducing white noise and providing straight mathematical answers.

The matrix is made up of four states:

State	Explanation
U.S.-Iran agreement	The current situation. Both sides trying to stop clashes.
Peace in Lebanon	This is a condition attached to Iranian involvement in any peace agreement. By it, we mean that an agreement between Lebanese and Israeli authorities is reached.
Hezbollah dismantled	It is considered a challenge for the peace in Lebanon. Although an agreement might be struck between Israel and the Lebanese government, Hezbollah remains a destabilizing force.
Israel-Iran agreement	This step would mean the top achievement in the peace process in the Middle East.

The uncertainty comes with the weighs assigned to each step in the matrix. Of course, these values are subject to discussion. In the same vein, we have tried many different weighs in different matrices in order to get conclusions which are significant and relevant to better understand the situation and the likelihood of events.

No absorbing states have been included in the matrices under analysis, as the corresponding real-world conditions are assumed to be reversible.


2. CURRENT STATE

The actual situation has been depicted by the following matrix:

From \ To	US-Iran Agmt	Leb Peace	Hizbullah Dism	Isr-Iran Agmt
US-Iran Agmt	0,5	0,5	0	0
Leb Peace	0,7	0,2	0,1	0
Hizbullah Dism	0,5	0,3	0,1	0,1
Isr-Iran Agmt	0,9	0	0	0,1

At present, negotiations between the United States and Iran are marked by considerable uncertainty. Although the two governments had reached an agreement, that arrangement has since collapsed. Prior to its breakdown, both parties sought to shape the prevailing narrative around different dimensions of the dispute, including the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, de-mining arrangements, and the scope of issues addressed in the talks. Overall, while both sides appear to retain an interest in reaching an agreement, neither is willing to do so at any cost.

The equilibrium is reached with the following result:




In the end, the agreement between the warring countries seems to find its way through, but it is not an overwhelming fact. It reflects its ups and downs, the fragility within.

The system is characterized by a "tactical ceiling" where diplomatic energy is perpetually recycled between US-mediated agreements and localized Lebanese stability. With a 57.7% probability of residing in the US-Iran Agreement

state, the model suggests this is the system's gravitational centre—a baseline of "managed friction" that prevents total collapse but **lacks the kinetic energy to propel the region toward deeper structural shifts.**

The primary bottleneck for regional transformation is the "Hezbollah Dismantlement" state. Mathematically, this state acts as a high-resistance filter with a low steady-state occupancy of 4.2% and a high regression rate (80% probability of collapsing back to US-Iran or Lebanon peace states). Because this state is the sole gateway to the Israel-Iran Agreement, **its inherent instability creates a structural firewall.**

The 0.1 transition probability from Hezbollah Dismantlement to an Israel-Iran Agreement, coupled with a 0.9 regression rate from that final state back to the US-Iran baseline, indicates that even if a breakthrough occurs, it is mathematically unsustainable under current transition dynamics.




An Israel-Iran Agreement or a comprehensive regional peace is a generational outlier, not a policy-adjacent reality. A nearly 20-year horizon suggests that the current variables do not support a "grand bargain" within a standard political cycle. **From an intelligence perspective, the data suggests that diplomatic resources are best allocated toward reinforcing the Lebanon-US-Iran loop (the 95% certainty),** as any attempt to force the Hezbollah Dismantlement threshold will likely result in a rapid regression to the mean, wasting strategic capital on a state with only a 0.5% long-term probability of success.

3. OPTIMISTIC APPROACH

The following matrix approaches the topic from a very optimistic view. In this case, we have studied the situation considering a **change of regime in Tehran**.

From \ To	US-Iran Agmt	Leb Peace	Hizbullah Dism	Isr-Iran Agmt
US-Iran Agmt	0,7	0,3	0	0
Leb Peace	0,7	0,2	0,1	0
Hizbullah Dism	0,5	0,3	0,1	0,1
Isr-Iran Agmt	0,1	0	0	0,9

Under this scenario, an agreement between Washington and Tehran appears highly probable. However, the prospective Iranian authorities would be unlikely to pursue an immediate agreement with Jerusalem, given the political sensitivities and strategic constraints associated with such a development. Iran and Israel have been close enemies for decades and mistrust is installed in the DNA of both societies.



With a steady-state equilibrium of 67.6%, the US-Iran Agreement is not merely a diplomatic goal but **the structural floor of the entire system**. The transition matrix confirms that regional de-escalation is strictly sequential: Lebanon

Peace depends almost entirely (70% return rate) on the US-Iran baseline. This indicates that any progress toward Lebanese stability is in this case a subset of US-Iran relations rather than a self-sustaining phenomenon.

The primary bottleneck for regional transformation is the transition from "Lebanon Peace" to "Hezbollah Dismantlement." The system exhibits an extreme 90% attrition rate at this juncture, where attempts to move toward dismantlement instead regress back into the US-Iran (50%) or Lebanon Peace (30%) states. **This mathematical fragility suggests that Hezbollah's current status is a structural prerequisite for the system's current stability;** the 2.9% steady-state probability for dismantlement indicates that the regional actors are caught in a cycle of "managed friction" rather than resolution.



The most surprising result is that in this optimistic situation the time to get an agreement between Israel and Iran is longer than in alleged worse scenarios. That's explainable if stability of that agreement is considered. In this scenario, the survival of the peace agreement is a long lasting one, while in worse scenarios if a peace agreement is ever reached, it would be very unstable.

An Israel-Iran Agreement—calculated at 330 months (27.5 years)—quantifies the **systemic resistance to a terminal peace**. While the Israel-Iran state is the most resilient once achieved (90% self-stability), the path to it is blocked by the "Hezbollah Chokepoint."

Geopolitically, this confirms that an Israel-Iran breakthrough is a multi-generational project. Under current transition probabilities, the region is mathematically destined to fluctuate between bilateral containment and fragile Lebanese truces, with a comprehensive settlement remaining a statistical outlier for the next quarter-century.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Other events have been considered. For instance, if Hezbollah took control of Lebanon, it would render impossible any agreement in the region. In that case, even a change of regime in Iran would turn useless.

The most favourable situation would be a change of regime in Iran coupled with an invasion of Lebanon. This invasion should be carried out by the U.S., not Israel. In this unlikely situation, an agreement between Jerusalem and Tehran could be struck within a year.

The most plausible outcome is therefore another fragile agreement between Tehran and Washington. Both parties have incentives to pursue such an arrangement, albeit for distinct strategic reasons. Even if a given agreement collapses, it is likely to be followed by subsequent attempts at negotiation. Over time, this sequence of recurrent and partially unsuccessful agreements may generate a limited form of stability. In this sense, the relationship may settle into a paradoxical condition: a form of "Schrödinger's peace agreement" that is neither fully operative nor entirely absent but instead becomes a durable feature of the regional order.

Until a deeper change occurs in any of the parties involved (U.S., Iran, Israel or Hezbollah) such as a new President in the oval office, change of regime in Iran or alike, the instability will remain the most likely scenario in the region.

To get peace settled in the region, all scenarios indicate that a generation-long dialogue is required. However, steps in that direction can be performed in the coming months and time should not be wasted. The sooner, the better.

